| Supply credibility4 / 4Code · not field-tested | The pinned subsidy function uses a 2.1 billion PRL parameter and declines with height; this is not an independent circulation audit. Scoring rubric0 discretionary issuance; 1 weak constraints; 2 major rule gaps; 3 predictable continuing issuance; 4 explicit finite issuance. This axis favors a finite supply, not a purchasing-power outcome. |
| Purchasing-power preservation—Unscored | Comparable empirical evidence is missing; retain unknown pending independent samples. Scoring rubricSix projects now have a common U.S. CPI real-return sample. Cross-basket robustness and 0–4 thresholds remain undefined, so bands stay unknown. |
| Purchasing-power stability—Unscored | Comparable empirical evidence is missing; retain unknown pending independent samples. Scoring rubricSix projects have aligned historical purchasing-power, volatility and drawdown data; common 0–4 thresholds are still undefined. Mechanisms and future potential receive separate conditional analysis. Scoring history does not require proving future stability. |
| Distribution neutrality—Unscored | A subsidy function alone cannot establish no preallocation or fair participation; genesis, early miners and ownership need review. Scoring rubric0 exclusive allocation; 1 designated issuance beneficiaries; 2 mining with launch or ownership gaps; 3 relatively documented open issuance history; 4 independently verified history and beneficial ownership. |
| Censorship resistance—Unscored | Comparable empirical evidence is missing; retain unknown pending independent samples. Scoring rubric0 central permission; 1 prominent filter point; 2 open broadcast with visible targeting clues; 3 default privacy limits targeting; 4 supported by measurements across attack scenarios. |
| Privacy & fungibility0 / 4Document-based | The explorer exposes transaction values; ZK for computation is not default shielding of ordinary payments. Scoring rubric0 ordinary transfers public; 1 limited-field protection or visible boundaries; 2 optional shielding of parties and amounts; 3 strong default protection with notable exceptions; 4 mandatory multi-field protection for ordinary transfers. No level implies absolute anonymity. |
| Self-sovereignty4 / 4Document-based | The official repository offers node and self-custody wallet paths; recovery and node verification have not been independently tested. Scoring rubric0 mandatory custody; 1 severely restricted exit; 2 permission-dependent self-custody; 3 self-custody with specific dependencies; 4 native key custody and an independent-node path. Protocol capability does not guarantee practical access. |
| Independent verifiability2 / 4Document-based | The novel work proof is specified publicly; this research has not reproduced all validation and security assumptions. Scoring rubric0 unauditable issuance; 1 one authority; 2 incomplete critical validation; 3 independently verifiable proofs or extension rules; 4 directly inspectable public amounts and transactions. This axis favors audit directness, not superior security. |
| Settlement security2 / 4Code · not field-tested | Mainnet parameters specify a 194-second target; interval is not economic finality. Scoring rubric0 unilateral reversal; 1 limited consensus assurance; 2 verifiable PoW with unmeasured economic security; 3 more documented rules and operating history; 4 aligned attack-cost and operational measurements. |
| Monetary governance2 / 4Document-based | Repository and updates are public; practical checks among developers, pools and nodes need examination. Scoring rubric0 unilateral control; 1 dominant control point; 2 open proposals or code with influence gaps; 3 more documented public change procedures; 4 empirically established dispersed checks and accountability. |